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     1 In Kidd’s original complaint, she based her charges of discrimination on national origin
instead of race.  For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, MBNA did not contest that
Kidd had exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her claims of racial
discrimination.  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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Before: McKEE and SMITH, Circuit Judges and WEIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
(Filed   March 25, 2004)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, Alero Kidd appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgement for
the defendant, MBNA America Bank.  Kidd sued her employer, MBNA, alleging that it
denied her various promotions and transfers because of her race1, sex, age and/or in
2retaliation for having raised discrimination claims.  Kidd also alleged discriminatory
harassment and a hostile work environment.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of this
case in detail.  Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
We apply the same test the district court should have applied initially.  Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). “We must review all of the evidence in
the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but making
no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133, 135. (1986).
Summary judgment is appropriate Aif the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).  The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  To be a genuine issue, the evidence must be 
Asuch that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.@  Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  
     2Although this analysis was originally formulated for cases brought under Title VII it has been
adapted for use in ADEA cases as well.  See eg., Maxfield v. Sinclair International, 766 F.2d 788
(3d Cir.1985)
3
II. Discrimination Claims
Disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII and the ADEA2 are analyzed
using the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).  Under this analysis, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing
of discrimination by establishing that (i) she belongs to a protected class; (ii) she applied
for and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (iii) though qualified, she
was rejected; and (iv) circumstances give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination
such as might occur when the position is filled by a person not of the protected class. 
Jones v. School District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d. Cir. 1999).
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination  the burden
shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.  The burden
then shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the nondiscriminatory reason
articulated by the defendant is in fact a pretext for discrimination.  Id. at 804.  
To avoid summary judgment in a Title VII or ADEA action after the employer has
proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the
plaintiff must produce evidence which: (1) casts sufficient doubt upon each proffered
4reason so that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that each reason was fabrication, or
(2) allows a fact finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating
or determinative cause of action.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994). 
This burden is met through a demonstration that such “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons for its action are such that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
‘unworthy of credence’” Id.
We find that Kidd only established a prima facie in one instance of denial of
promotion; the S.A. Coach position.  We agree with the district court’s determination that
Kidd failed to provide any evidence that similarly situated persons not in a protected class
were treated more favorably in any of her other denials of promotion.  Kidd is a member
of a protected class, and was rejected for various positions, however, the circumstances
do not give rise to an inference of discrimination even when viewed in a light most
favorable to Kidd. 
Although Kidd did establish a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to the
S.A. Coach position, MBNA provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for
its decision.  Fuentes v. Perksie 32 F.3d 759 (3 rd Cir. 1994).  MBNA explains her
disparate treatment by asserting that it merely made a mistake and forgot to check the
corrective action status for the employee promoted to the S.A. Coach position.  Kidd fails
to respond to that explanation with anything that would create an issue of fact as to
5pretext for discrimination.  
Left unrebutted, the fact that MBNA claims it made a mistake on one employee’s
application does not suggest a weakness, implausability or incoherency in MBNA’s
proffered explanation.  Therefore, we find there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
regarding MBNA’s failure to promote Kidd.  
III.  Retaliation Claim
Like discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the ADEA, in order to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (i) she
engaged in protected activity; (ii) the defendant took adverse employment action against
her; and (iii) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. 
Kachmar v. Sungard Data System 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).  In support of her claim,
Kidd asserts that she overheard managers discuss the complaint she made to the EEO. 
However, she failed to  present any evidence to link these managers to MBNA’s decision
not to promote her.  Accordingly, she did not show the required causal link between her
complaint and MBNA’s subsequent denials of promotion.  
IV. Hostile Work Environment
 In order to establish her claim for employment discrimination due to a hostile
work environment, Kidd had to establish, (1) that she suffered intentional discrimination
because of race; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected her; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable
6person of the same race in that position; and (5) the existence of respondent superior
liability.  See Aman v. Cort Furniture, 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d. Cir. 1996), West v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir.1995).  In analyzing a hostile work
environment claim, we must look at the totality of the circumstances including the
frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
and whether it unreasonably interferes with the work performance of the employee.  Id.
Kidd presents evidence that a male co-worker made several disparaging remarks to
her which referenced her national origin and that he made other threatening comments
including references to a gun.  
The comments were certainly obnoxious and had no place in the work
environment.  However, these comments by a single coworker do not establish that
discrimination was pervasive and regular.  Although Kidd argues that the harassment she
suffered was continuous and lasted until her co-worker was terminated, she only
presented evidence of a few isolated incidents.  That is insufficient to establish a cause of
action for a hostile work environment under Title VII. 
III.
For the above reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the district court.  
